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Introduction On 6th July 1988, a series of explosionsripped apart the Piper Alpha platform, a major NorthSea oil installation, killing 167 people. The subsequent
inquiry into this, the world's worst offshore industrial acci-
dent, proved a moment of exposure both for oil companies
and for the British Government, whose regulatory failings
were heavily implicated in the disaster leading to the creation
of a new offshore safety regime. Yet, as readers of this Jour-
nal will be all too aware - especially given recent experi-
ences following the Westray mining disaster - even where
health and safety disasters indicate legal reform, law is al-
ways, in its development, interpretation and enforcement, a
site of struggle.! This paper outlines some key elements of
this struggle as it relates to the regulation of safety in the
UK offshore sector.
The struggle involves some of the world's largest, most
powerful transnational actors: oil companies constitute five
of the 40 largest companies in the world, and five of the
20 largest companies in the US.2 Beyond the enormous social
and economic power which accrues to corporations of this
size and reach, oil companies are a particularly powerful
manifestation of the corporate form because oil is a strategic
commodity of geo-political significance. Private corpora-
tions who possess the resources to exploit this commodity
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are immediately placed in a particularly advantageous posi-
tion vis-a-vis national states.
Increasingly, when examining national-state regulation of
transnational private capital, the discourse of globalization
must be taken into account. Despite intense academic debate
about the nature and reality of globalization tendencies them-
selves, there is no doubt that the discourses of globalization
have assumed the status of a hegemonic truth, a new ortho-
doxy.J It is the "perceived dictats'vl of this orthodoxy which
governments invoke as they seek to attract or retain private
capital through various forms of de- and re-regulation, im-
pose massive cutbacks in the social wage and, more gener-
ally, reproduce the "political construction of helplessness.v-
It is this orthodoxy to which transnational capital points as
it seeks to increase its leverage over national states, and
both intra- and inter-national sources of resistance. This pa-
per is, in part, a case study of the ways in which, and the
effects to which, such discourses of globalization are used
by already powerful companies even (and especially) at mo-
ments when they seem most vulnerable to greater state and
pro-regulatory scrutiny.
The empirical focus of this paper is upon the period fol-
lowing the Piper Alpha disaster. This period saw the emer-
gence of a new project launched by the oil companies -
Cost Reduction Initiative for the New Era (CRINE) - which
seeks to redefine the realities of production offshore. While
these new "realities" of production are highly contestable,
they have proven crucial in defining what is deemed to be
reasonably practicable in terms of safety protection offshore.
Indeed, we argue that CRINE has been the key vehicle of
a concerted effort by oil companies operating in the North
Sea to undermine the new safety regime. Recent UK Gov-
ernments have been compliant, even complicit, in the oil
companies" (largely successful) efforts.
Piper Alpha, Cullen and the Goal-setting Regime In
1985, OPEC's quota system collapsed, and the price of oil
plummeted from $30 a barrel in November 1985 to $10 in
April 1986. The effects of this price crash were profound,
and the UK controlled sector of the North Sea, the United
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Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS), was not immune.
There, "The majors cut their budget by 30 to 40 per cent"6
and 1986 saw 22,000 jobs lost in the industry." Also in 1986,
Drilling fell by 40%, as companies abandoned projects like the
discovery of new fields in favour of the limited expansion of
existing ones ... The majors could tide this one out. But the
effects on supply and exploration companies was more deadly.
The Royal Bank of Scotland calculated that sums of £60 billion
in future North Sea investment, 1985-90, would have to be re-
vised downwards by at least 50 per cent. For the suppliers, even
a fall in demand for their services of more than one-third was
near catastrophic.e
This period did mark something of a crisis for companies
operating in the UKCS, since it marked the end of a period
of windfall profits.? The ad hoc responses of oil companies
were taken on a company-by-company basis; thus, one con-
sequence of the price crash was, for a period at least, an
intensification of competition between individual compa-
nies.J?
These factors are an important context for understanding
the Piper Alpha disaster. More specifically, the disaster oc-
curred in an economic context defined by the twin pressures
of cost reduction and increased production; in a sector where
a relatively powerless workforce was marginalised from the
process of safety management, II and under pressure to adopt
high risk work practices--; and in a regulatory framework
which had been constructed in a way that was subservient
to the exigencies of the "political economy of speed." 13 In
combination, these factors militated strongly against the de-
velopment of an effective safety regime.
Indeed, the history of the UK offshore oil sector up to
this point had been a short but bloody one during which
over 450 workers had been killed. Recently published quan-
titative evidencel" suggests that there is little likelihood of
abating the carnage. Contrary to claims being made by the
oil companies since 198815, the industry's safety record is
not improving. Woolfson and colleagues used government
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) figures for fatalities and
serious injuries combinedl", excluding minor injuries in or-
der to minimise reporting problems, to analyse changes in
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injury rates over two separate periods of time. First, they
examined the impact on incident rates of the 1985 price
crash and consequent budget cuts in the North Sea. They
found an average combined incident rate of 238 per 100,000
workers per year for the pre-1985 period (1980-84), while
the post-1985 period (1985-93) revealed a significantly
higher average rate of 363 per 100,000. Second, they com-
pared the combined rate for two 5-year periods before and
after the Piper Alpha disaster (excluding the number of fa-
talities and serious injuries associated with the disaster itself)
amongst three particularly high risk groups of offshore work-
ers.l? For the 5-year period preceding Piper Alpha, the com-
bined rate averages 284 incidents per 100,000 workers each
year; for the five years following the disaster, the average
rose to 293. The evidence points to no improvement, and
perhaps to a steady decline, in safety performance over the
most recent periods examined.
However, this outcome was hardly predictable when Lord
Cullen, appointed to oversee a Public Inquiry into the causes
of the Piper Alpha disaster, produced his final report in 1990.
The report read as a damning indictment of Occidental, the
operators of the installation, concluding it was guilty of a
"string" of errors and lapses, amounting to a "superficial
attitude to likely risks" and "gross negligence." Cullen was
equally scathing with regards to the inadequacy of the regu-
latory regime. He concluded that the Department of Energy
could not regulate safety effectively given its simultaneous
role in promoting the development of the North Sea, instead,
he recommended that the HSE assume responsibility for off-
shore safety regulation. Cullen proposed a reconstruction of
the safety regime within which the application and assess-
ment of safety standards was to be driven by the principle
of self regulation. The new regulatory system was to be
based around "goal-setting," which would "take the form of
requiring that stated objectives are to be met...rather than
prescribing that detailed measures are to be taken." Self-
regulation was to be achieved largely through the use of
safety cases .18
In contrast to the "prescription" model, where standards of
safety are set by detailed specifications for plant equipment
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and procedures, "goal-setting" allows a greater decision-
making role for employers and site duty holders (normally
owners) in the setting of safety standards. Minimal legal
duties are based on levels of risk which should be "as low
as reasonably practicable" (ALARP). ALARP is now a key
concept in the offshore oil industry as it is in hazardous
onshore industries.
A careful reading of Chapter 21 of the Cullen report,
which sets out the "Future Offshore Safety Regime," reveals
that this Chapter draws principally upon the submissions of
the HSE, the Department of Energy; the Norwegian Petro-
leum Directorate; and the oil majors Conoco, Amoco, Chev-
ron, ICI and Shell. The detailed submission from the trade
union group on self-regulation and goal-setting - an un-
equivocal defence of the principle of prescribed minimum
standards 19 - is not even mentioned. Consequently, the ap-
proach to offshore safety regulation adopted by Cullen is
extremely close to that which is publicly promoted by those
companies whose activities are to be regulated.
Our argument here, and elsewhere-", is that ultimately
the oil industry in the UK sector has successfully resisted
additional capital and operating expenditures that may have
resulted from new, more stringent regulatory requirements.
Certainly, the Piper Alpha disaster and the Cullen Report,
however they might also have proven a watershed for off-
shore safety, did represent a moment of exposure for the
industry.U The Cullen Report highlighted the supremacy of
management decisions and the securing of profits through
the creation of risk. It was also "the first government spon-
sored document to tacitly acknowledge the existence of the
NRB [Not Required Back],"22 a notorious system of on-the-
spot dismissal, used across the industry. Moreover, parts of
the British state - particularly the Department of Energy -
were exposed to a crisis of legitimacy as the report was
unremitting in its damning of its role in the circumstances
leading up to the disaster. Indeed, for a brief period following
the disaster, the balance of power amongst social forces did
shift from employers in the UKCS to a range of pro-regu-
latory forces. Such was the political fallout of the Piper
Alpha disaster, in combination with a series of other major
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incidents affecting workers and the public in the late 1980s,
that for a brief period pro-regulatory forces won ascendancy
even in the face of groups of employers that had become
used to the non-enforcement of existing standards and a gov-
ernment committed to deregulation of occupational safety
and health.23
A tragic legacy of the disaster, however, is that it was
followed by - perhaps it even prompted - an organised re-
grouping on the part of oil companies. The necessity of such
a response was furthered by estimates of the cost of the
Piper Alpha disaster to the oil industry, indicating that there
were likely to be considerable direct and indirect costs re-
lated to any improved safety regime.e'
The aftermath of the oil price crash of 1985/86 saw in-
dividual oil companies respond in a competitive and piece-
meal fashion; however, immediate reactions to the Piper
Alpha disaster limited the ability of particular companies to
sustain such a response. During the early 1990s there
emerged a more organised and collective initiative on the
part of offshore operators which sought to alter the condi-
tions under which the exploitation and development of off-
shore oil would proceed. This initiative, organised by and
through the oil companies' collective voice the "UK Offshore
Operators" Association (UKOOA), invoked the language of
maturity, of alternative sources of oil and possible relocation,
of economic and uneconomic oil, of restructuring and cost-
cutting, and of the potential contribution of the industry to
the economic health of the nation.25 UKOOA's "Cost Re-
duction Initiative for the New Era," henceforth CRINE, was
constructed as the only basis upon which a "bright future"
for operators, contractors, suppliers, and the nation could
be secured.w
CRINE: Defining the UK Oil and Gas Industry's New
Era The "Cost Reduction Initiative for the New Era" has
been described as, "an industry-wide initiative with the main
objective of making it possible to achieve a 30% or more re-
duction in capital costs for any future oil and gas facilities
development. This cost reduction will ... continue to maximise
the remaining recoverable reserves, improve the construction
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industry's competItIveness in the international arena and
thereby help sustain employment at a higher level than would
otherwise be possible.t'-? Notwithstanding this original ref-
erence to capital expenditures, CRINE now also targets op-
erating expenditures. More recent statements have targeted
a "30% reduction in capital costs" and "50% cut in operating
costs within 2-3 years."28 Why, and how, such targets are
to be met is indicated in the following discussion of four
central themes of the CRINE initiative.
1. CRINE and Survival First, CRINE is couched in terms
of the very survival of the North Sea offshore sector. The
initiative is centrally located within the exigencies arising
from the relative decline in the competitiveness of the UKCS
vis-a-vis other oil industries and the international oil econ-
omy.-? Put simply, the success of CRINE is represented as
the necessary condition for the survival of the UK offshore
oil industry: "CRINE is a dynamic and positive UKCS re-
sponse to the pressures of competition in the world of oil
... At stake is the future prosperity of all who are, and will
be, dependent on the continued success of the UKCS offshore
industry, together with its industrial support base."30
The implication is that without CRINE, future field ex-
ploration and development will not take place - oil will re-
main in the ground. The high-cost UK offshore industry has
to operate in the international market place, within which
oil companies are looking to alternative investment locations,
typically Mexico, Vietnam, the Maldives, China, Indonesia,
Malaysia.U Tim Eggar, the Conservative Government's Min-
ister for Industry and Energy at the time,32 was amongst
those quick to warn of a doomsday scenario for the UK's
oil industry: "unless we can reduce these costs, we face
falling producing at home and dwindling orders (for off-
shore equipment) abroad. We face the decline of the North
Sea ... Only radically new approaches can ensure our suc-
cess. "33
This is not to deny the existence of some dissenting voices
within and around the industry regarding the necessity of
CRINE. Prominent oil industry economist, Tony Mackay,
for one, is doubtful that CRINE is fundamental to survival
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pointing out that "it could be one of those management fads
- like TQM [Total Quality Management] - which seemed
essential at the time, but in two or three years are completely
forgotten.t'vt He argues that high investment risk is a nec-
essary feature of the industry, and that it goes hand in hand
with the prospect of high returns on capital: "oil company
profits are greatly influenced by oil prices and they can af-
ford to take a long term view if fields are going to produce
for 25-30 years. If initial capital expenditure has been re-
duced, through alliances, and oil prices rise in the future
-as most industry economists expect - then the oil compa-
nies will do very well."35
Clearly the question of the price of oil is an important
one. Perhaps unsurprisingly, industry claims regarding the
need for cost cutting often include gloomy predictions of
future price trends. For example, in 1992, Chris Fay, Man-
aging Director of Shell UK, told a Confederation of British
Industry conference that he saw "absolutely no reason to
expect prices to rise dramatically for many years to come,
perhaps even this century."36 Despite the caution urged by
senior managers, the projections of economists such as
Mackay of a sharp rise in prices past the end of the century
indicate a high chance of a sizeable return on capital in-
vestment in the North Sea. CRINE has certainly reduced
the size of capital deployment necessary for individual de-
velopment projects-? and, by reducing the risk on invest-
ment, has thus increased the prospects for large "windfall"
profits in the future at a significantly reduced capital cost.
It is important to remind ourselves that these kinds of
gloomy prognostications regarding the state of the industry
are not new; they are, however, likely to be tactical. Writing
in 1982, Carson noted that, "the history of the North Sea
in the 1970s is littered with industry warnings and reports,
often felicitously timed to coincide with new government
through over-stating the prospects of relocation on the part
of capital currently investing in the UKCS. However, there
are at least six reasons why continued exploitation of the
North Sea sector is more likely than relocation.
First, the business of oil is distinct from many other areas
of economic activity. Given that oil represents a finite resource
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(on at least one level), and given the capital intensive nature
of the industry, it would be highly problematic for any par-
ticular company which had made an investment in terms of
exploration and production in an oil-producing region to sim-
ply "up anchor" and leave before the end of the productive
life of the field. This is particularly true in the North Sea
where the very fact that the costs of production remain rela-
tively high means that to engage in upstream activity is a
massive investment with individual installations representing
a financial commitment of 20-25 years. The high costs of
development and production, which are particularly great in
the North Sea, are real disincentives against relocation.
Second, it remains more economic to exploit oil around
existing fields, for both general reasons (for example, in
existing areas of activity there already exists "a comprehen-
sive infrastructure of pipelines, platforms and sub-sea in-
stallations'tj.J? and for particular reasons (for example, the
ability to refloat some types of platforms to other parts of
the UKCS).4o Third, in an industry where transportation can
be logistically difficult and/or highly expensive, the UKCS
has the advantage of proximity to "huge ready-made energy
markets in Continental Europe.t'U
Fourth, there are still considerable reserves to be ex-
ploited. Although there is intense uncertainty and disagree-
ment on the precise extent of these reserves, it is worth
noting that, historically, the oil industry has consistently un-
der-estimated the reserves of oil in existence both globally
and regionally,42 not least "to mislead the government and
avoid taxes."43 The extreme sensitivity with which this issue
is treated was particularly apparent in October 1992 when
President of the Board of Trade, Michael Heseltine, was
publicly reprimanded by senior representatives of the oil
majors for daring to suggest that the North Sea may have
50 years of productive life left.44
Fifth, the UK represents a politically stable context in
which to operate - a consideration that has driven the search
for sources of oil other than those located in the Middle East
and South America.t> Thus Lascelles has commented that,
"although oilmen complain about the UK's high costs, they
still see the North Sea as one of the world's most attractive
81
Studies in Political Economy
exploration areas because of the high quality of the oilfields
and the hospitable political environment.t'sf One particular
aspect of this context has been the overtly pro-business
stances? of recent Conservative Governments" fiscal and
economic policies, a stance which the new Labour admini-
stration shows little signs of challenging. Finally, the UK's
tax regime for the offshore industry is a highly favourable
one, to the extent that it has been subject to a great deal of
recent comment.sf Indeed, two oil economists have noted
that "the UK currently has the weakest petroleum taxation
regime in the World. "49
In their combination, these factors indicate that the
chances of an immediate or longer-term exodus of capital
from the North Sea are extremely slim. Indeed, if oil capital
was going to relocate at any time, it would have done so
in the mid-eighties, after the collapse of the OPEC cartel
quota system. Yet there was no such exodus: in fact, despite
gloomy predictions, capital investment doubled in the five
years following the slump, rising from £2.5 billion in 1986
to over £5 billion in 1991.50 Moreover, while the current
price of oil may be much lower than it was in the early
1980s, the price of producing a barrel of oil has been con-
sistently pushed down,51 this has been much less well pub-
licised by the oil companies.V None of these factors have
prevented UKOOA from representing relocation as a real
threat in order to argue for the necessity of CRINE. The
discourses of survival, relocation, and globalization are in-
timately, though hardly subtly, linked through CRINE.
2. CRINE and Deregulation CRINE is explicitly related to
proposals for deregulation. The original CRINE statement
expressed explicit support for the Government's own "Bur-
dens on Business" (deregulation) initiative;53 and, in turn,
CRINE was encouraged by government ministers. Indeed, it
is impossible to understand the origins and power of CRINE
without locating it in a symbiotic relationship with, first, the
Government's commitment to deregulation,54 and second,
the results of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
Working Group on UKCS Competitiveness. It is reasonable
to speak of a nexus (of considerable strength) between
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CRINE, the DTI Working Group on UKCS Competitiveness,
and the DTI Deregulation Initiative.
Tim Eggar announced his intention to set up the "Working
Group on UKCS Competitiveness" in October 1992 under
the auspices of the Department of Trade and Industry's "Off-
shore Industry Liaison Committee.t'-> It comprised repre-
sentatives from the oil industry, the offshore supplies
industry, the DTI and the Scottish Trades Unions Congress
(STUC).56 Its terms of reference were: "to identify and ex-
amine proposals for improving the competitiveness of the
UK Continental Shelf; to consider possible initiatives which
could be taken in order to achieve a reduction in capital
expenditure and/or operating costs; to make recommenda-
tions by February 1993 to the President of the Board of
Trade and the Minister for Energy on action which could
be taken by the industry and/or Govemment.t'-?
The report it published in March 1993, reads almost as
a blueprint for the deregulation of the industry. On health
and safety, the committee urged that the "HSE expedite the
establishment of a new safety regime based on goal setting
rather than prescription." The committee sought to establish
a key role for UKOOA in this process, stating that "UKOOA
should urgently provide HSE with its priorities for repeal
or adjustment of existing proscribed legislation." The com-
mittee went on to conclude that "considerable scope exists
for securing a reduction in [documentation] costs" and that
such actions "should be implemented by CRINE."58 The
publication of this Report saw CRINE shift from an ad hoc
industry working group of project managers on the fringes
of UKOOA to the centre of industry strategy. Thus Eggar
told the inaugural CRINE conference in December 1993,59
"since the report of my working group in February, UK-
OOA has adopted the CRINE initiative ... I welcome it and
congratulate those involved. It becomes a handbook that
should remain open on desks throughout the industry. "60
Perhaps more significantly, Eggar's speech signalled a
new partnership between the Department of Trade and In-
dustry and the oil companies: "I ... want to confirm that the
DTI will be a full partner in pursuing the changes needed
Partnership means making your concerns our concerns.
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It means the DTI searching relentlessly to find ways to help
the environment in which you operate.t'v! Effectively, this
signalled the DTI's intention that CRINE would assume a
role as an advisory body to government. Since then, the
DTI has been an equal partner with the industry in the
CRINE project. Conferences are now jointly organised by
UKOOA and the DTI, and in 1995, the Department donated
£100,000 for the work of the CRINE Office to match the
operating companies" funding.P- As Minister for Industry
and Energy, Eggar called for "additional proposals on de-
regulation" which "would be very welcome from industry."63
The government has continued to support the deregulation
agenda of CRINE by periodically requesting suggestions for
deregulation from UKOOA and the CRINE secretariat.vl
3. New Attitudes and Relationships A third explicit element
of CRINE is an attempt to develop new attitudes in order
to establish relationships of trust amongst those working
offshore, to shift from an adversarial culture to one based
upon partnership.s- Thus there have been calls for "close
co-operation between design, fabrication and installation
contractors" resulting in "the elimination of much ineffi-
ciency and duplication.vsv The one group that is not men-
tioned as participating in this new close co-operation are
workers; by contrast, they have to be convinced of the "bene-
fits" of CRINE, not least through the disciplining effect of
the threat of unemployment:
CRINE is not - I repeat not - a deliberate attack on jobs. To be
complacent and do nothing would indeed be an attack on jobs
since we know that the industry would not survive if its past
adversarial and wasteful working practices were to continue.
We have to find the cure before the patient dies. The simple
question we must all ask ourselves is do we wish to have 60%
of something or 100% of nothing? Getting the true meaning of
CRINE across to all sectors of our industry is one of CRINE's
main objectives for 1995.67
Yet the period since the emergence of CRINE has been one
of continual job losses.68 In 1991 there were about 35,000
workers employed offshore, a figure which had fallen to
27,000 in 1995,69 and was "below 25,000 and dropping" at
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the start of 1996.70 Some companies have aimed at reducing
their offshore workforce by nearly 50%.71
Further, to the extent that CRINE has effected real
changes in the relationships between companies, contractors
and suppliers, then competitiveness within the industry has
been reduced - that is, there has occurred a restructuring
which has resulted in an oligopolistic response to increased
competition. Thus the alliances and strategic partnerships
advocated by CRINE have been criticised by some within
the industry as generating barriers to entry; ensuring the
dominance of large, existent companies; encouraging bureau-
cratic inefficiency, stifling innovation; and creating the con-
ditions for possible price-fixing and cartelisation.R The
benefits of CRINE have been unequally distributed: "The
current alliances favour the oil companies. They have been
quite successful in passing on a much greater share of risk
to contractors without passing on a share of potential re-
wards."73 The establishment of new relationships, of prin-
ciples of partnership and the end of adversarial culture urged
by the language of CRINE, have acted largely, if not exclu-
sively, to the economic benefit of the operators.
4. CRINE and Safety Finally, CRINE-related statements
consistently assert an absolute complementarity between the
goals of cost-reduction, efficiency, quality, and safety and
environmental protection.I" The original CRINE statement
noted that, "The correct implementation of CRINE recom-
mendations is fully synergic with the overall safety process
followed by the industry in the post-Cullen era ..," a view
which has been endorsed by government ministers 75 and the
HSE, the occupational safety and health regulators.Zv While
these sources claim that CRINE is likely to have the effect
of improving safety performance, it is perhaps no coinci-
dence that CRINE sources are careful to renounce respon-
sibility for potentially unsafe acts of cost cutting imple-
mented by individual companies.I?
In summary, the themes outlined above represent a set
of assumptions about the industry which have been widely
accepted by relevant parties. Indeed, CRINE represents a
deliberate strategy on the part of the industry to create a
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new set of "commercial realities." These realities are proving
to be a powerful propaganda tool, used by the operating
companies to create an environment which is more suited
to the corporate goal of ever increasing profit margins. If
the arguments on survivability are accepted in the first in-
stance, CRINE becomes accepted as unavoidable; as the only
possible means for the industry to remain competitive. Thus,
the rhetoric of CRINE becomes unchallengeable. The claims
made in the CRINE literature on new relationships, deregu-
lation and safety develop the CRINE narrative by setting a
new wide-ranging agenda for the industry. If CRINE is ac-
cepted as being unavoidable, it becomes difficult to chal-
lenge the claims of CRINE on particular points, such as the
challenge made by the trade unions to the claim that CRINE
will ultimately preserve jobs.78 Anybody who dares to chal-
lenge the perceived wisdom of CRINE is seen either as a
threat, a malevolent force, or is seen as acting against the
interests of the industry. Where the assumptions made by
CRINE have been challenged, the industry has acted quickly
to discredit and undermine such resistance.Z? Certainly work-
ers who resist the worst excesses of CRINE are marginalised
as malcontents or undesirables and are disposed of in the
same manner as ever: through the NRB. The remainder of
this paper comprises a critical examination of the relation-
ship between CRINE and occupational safety.
CRINE, Commercial Realities and Safety
Defining and Redefining ALARP Before we note some of
the empirical impacts of CRINE upon safety, it is worth
returning briefly to the concepts of goal-setting and the no-
tion of ALARP, "as low as reasonably practicable," for it
is through these that the effects of CRINE may in principle
influence levels of risk.
The definition of what represents ALARP is open to in-
terpretation, contestation, discretion, thereby allowing a greater
opportunity for input from duty holders as to what constitutes
reasonably practicable safety standards. The shift towards
goal-setting changes the process by which acceptable stand-
ards of safety are formulated and the roles of both regulatory
authority and duty holder. Instead of simply complying with
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a set of pre-determined minimum standards, the duty holder
is obliged to develop effective and practicable standards
suited to the plant and the regulator shifts from enforcing
legal minima to assisting duty holders in their new role.
It is claimed that goal-setting encourages companies to
maximise safety standards: "more affluent employers will
be expected, on a subjective application of reasonable prac-
ticability, to achieve a higher standard than the minimum.t's?
There are few sectors in the UK with more affluent employ-
ers than North Sea oil, however, the flexibility of interpre-
tation afforded by goal-setting poses potential problems for
enforcement in the offshore industries. Hall cites an inspec-
tor from the HSE's Offshore Safety Division (OSD) on this
point: "enforcement is likely to be more difficult in a goal-
setting regime. In a black and white situation, it's fairly
straight-forward - but now if you're in a goal setting regime
and they"re doing some things, not the way it should be
done, there's a lot of judgement involved as to whether it's
acceptable. "81
These problems are exacerbated by the particular ap-
proach adopted by the HSE within this model of goal setting.
Findings from a survey of inspectorss- leave little doubt
that the inspectorate is unwilling to involve itself in discus-
sions relating to anything other than the management of
safety. Further, the inspectorate's view of "safety manage-
ment" is a highly restrictive one ignoring the economic, po-
litical or social environment of the decision making process
in the industry. However, taking cognisance of this environ-
ment is crucial given that definitions of commercial viability
in general, and cost-benefit calculations in particularf- are
central to a determination of ALARP. The determined failure
by the inspectorate to seek to understand this environment,
and its concomitant acceptance of industry's assertions on
prevailing commercial conditions, means that the definition
of what is "reasonably practicable" relies upon a set of re-
alities that are determined by the operating oil companies
alone. In this context, the risk limits set by ALARP can be
adjusted by manipulating these commercial "realities."
In tum, ALARP may also be adjusted in order to accom-
modate the requirements of a changing economic environment,
87
Studies in Political Economy
and "the very standard of reasonable practicability, if defined
simply in terms of the employers" cost benefit equation, is
inevitably affected by recession. "84 The reduction of standby
vessel cover can be interpreted as a direct result of the re-
placement of a prescriptive regulation (which stipulated that
each platform should have its own standby vessel) by a pro-
vision for the standard of ALARP under new goal-setting
regulations.s> In such a way, the ALARP standard may be
adapted to respond to the commercial requirements of the
duty holder. Combining the newly defined realities of
CRINE, readily accepted throughout the industry as well as
by government departments (including the HSE), with the
fact that the concept of "reasonably practicable" allows the
lower limits of safety standards to be adjusted to whatever
happens to be the "commercial realities" of a particular mar-
ket at a particular period in time, and it may be literally
disastrous. In this way, there emerges a situation where
safety standards can be legally forced downwards.
The Impacts of CRINE: safety, risk and regulation To what
extent have new commercial realities, and the parameters
they place upon other business functions (such as safety),
impacted upon occupational safety in the offshore sector?
We approach this question through reference to qualitative
data gathered over the past three years in the course of ex-
tensive surveys of workers, managers and offshore inspec-
tors.86 While we cannot treat this data in any detail here,
it is worth summarising some of the general themes that
have emerged from these interviews as they address the con-
cerns of this paper.s?
The changing economic environment in the industry is
clearly a major preoccupation of operational managers and
managers in specialist safety roles. All of those in the sample
of managers (32 in total) expressed the view that the re-
sources made available by the operators for safety related
functions had increased dramatically in the period immedi-
ately after Piper Alpha, largely in response to Cullen, but
that more recent cost-cutting in the industry was having a
significant impact upon safety. The majority of those inter-
viewed specified that CRINE had placed greater pressures
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on all departments to justify every item of expenditure to
senior managers, a process from which safety expenditure
was certainly not exempt. Indeed, safety expenditure was
being reduced as priorities shifted further towards maximis-
ing profit levels. One interviewee said that previously, the
problem had been "cowboys" and poor managers on the plat-
forms, but that now she had to concentrate on those above
her in the hierarchy: "it's now the guys above you that you
have to convince about safety." The view that pressure had
to be applied to senior, board level managers to ensure re-
sources for safety spending was supported by the majority
of managers: "Local Managers see safety as essential, but
senior management see it as an evil necessity." In one case,
it was reported that one operating company had halved the
number of their safety advisors on the platforms and reduced
the safety department's budget by 70% in the past two years.
A large majority of managers supported the predominant
corporate and government view that CRINE was needed to
bail the industry out of an impending economic crisis. Thus,
in the opinion of most managers, CRINE is a compulsory,
rather than an optional, strategy for both operators and con-
tractors in the industry. Only two operating company man-
agers were skeptical of the necessity of CRINE. One referred
to the prioritisation of "short term gains," while a second
was adamant that this economic necessity was exaggerated
by the operating companies in order to allow the industry
to continue to extract large "windfall" profits, as opposed
to settling for marginal fields that would supply profits at
levels normally sustained by other industries. He questioned
the real need for CRINE and referred to one field in par-
ticular, which has been claimed to be marginal for almost
all of its productive life, yet has never failed to produce
enough oil to sustain large profit margins.
In general, managers were divided over the question of
whether CRINE actually represented a threat to safety. How-
ever, although some perceived threats to safety, while others
dismissed such claims and spoke of CRINE as creating new
challenges for them as managers, all viewed the pressure to
cut costs not as a temporary situation, but as a normal con-
dition of operation.
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The views of inspectors from the HSE's Offshore Safety
Division (OSD) were broadly similar. While most were
aware of the potential problems for safety created by CRINE
and cost-cutting in general, and while opinion was divided
over whether safety conditions were actually being threat-
ened, they were unanimous that cost cutting was essential
for the survival of the industry, and that CRINE is at best
an "efficiency driver" and at worst a necessary evil. Thus,
although some inspectors identified negative aspects of the
"new era" in North Sea production, there was a general ac-
ceptance of the necessity and inevitability of CRINE. Fur-
ther, the Inspectorate are clear that discussions with
operating companies relating to CRINE and cost cutting are
quite separate from safety monitoring and beyond their remit.
(By contrast, a large majority of workers and approximately
half of the sample of onshore managers interviewed clearly
believe that these issues are inseparable). The words of one
inspector sum up the HSE's attitude to these "separate" ac-
tivities of management: "CRINE says, 'we can reduce costs
without prejudicing safety.' Well if they can, fine ... We are
not management consultants, so it's out of our control. To
be blunt, it's nothing to do with us."
This formal, methodical separation of management func-
tions limits the Inspectorate's remit as regulator. In practice,
a regulatory strategy based around such a separation leaves
inspectors unable to tackle some of the issues that offshore
workers, and indeed managers, view as being of prime im-
portance to the maintenance of safe working conditions;
namely, the programme of expenditure cuts which is now
synonymous with CRINE.
It is perhaps unsurprising that, in general, workers were
skeptical of the HSE's ability to regulate safety effectively
on offshore installations. There seems to have been a wide-
spread, initial hope that the HSE would be a source of sup-
port to workers following the establishment of the new safety
regime; equally widespread is the subsequent disappoint-
ment. As one respondent put it: "It isn't the government
and the HSE on the one side and the companies on the other,
the relationship is not like this, they are closer." Indeed,
some workers interviewed believe that the HSE are heavily
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influenced by the political agenda of protecting the interests
of the oil companies: "If you are working on behalf of the
British government, you don't stop British industry, do you?"
According to a number of workers, the HSE's "hands are
tied," so that they are either unwilling or unable to enforce
their will upon companies. Beyond the atypical instance
where immediate remedial action was deemed necessary,
HSE officials normally negotiate with the company on the
action that should be taken to resolve a breach of safety
standards.
On one level, it is hardly surprising that such an approach
to enforcement characterises the work of the Offshore Safety
Division of HSE. This is a common, well documented ap-
proach to the enforcement of safety and health standards
both for the UK and elsewhere.sf However, in the context
of the offshore safety regime, this approach is notable for
at least two reasons. First, this regime, and the Offshore
Safety Division itself, were established following the world's
worst offshore industrial disaster which even the British
Government's appointee, Lord Cullen, "explained" in terms
of unacceptably poor management and regulatory practices.
Second, the (successful) efforts of oil capital operating in
the North Sea to emasculate this new regime have been or-
ganised, overt, and have proceeded on the basis of co-op-
eration from a key Government department, namely the DTI.
The clearest general conclusion from this work is that
CRINE has established cost-cutting as a legitimate strategy
and has created a number of serious threats to safety in the
offshore industries.s? It is revealing that while there appears
to be much support for the CRINE initiative amongst man-
agers, evidence provided on particular areas of expenditure
cuts seems to support comments made by the sample of
workers. The data from the interviews with both managers
and workers shows that cost-cutting is currently affecting
safety through cuts in maintenance budgets, reduction of
support vessel cover for installations, changes in shift pat-
terns, sporadic use of cheaper imported labour reductions
in workforces and related drives towards "multi-skilling."
If our qualitative evidence clearly points to the particular
ways in which CRINE has a negative impact upon safety
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protection, it remains too soon to measure its effects via
quantitative data. Present data strongly suggest that, at the
very least, the industry's safety record is showing no im-
provement: as we have seen, the combined fatality and se-
rious injury rate and fatalities alone (an imperfect but
nonetheless useful indicator of changing levels of safety)
continue at a horrific rate, and that the industry remains the
second most dangerous in the UK (second only to the pri-
vatised coal mining industryj.P? The continuing poor state
of offshore safety, and awareness at senior levels within the
industry is demonstrated through the words of one senior
operating company manager: "At the last [Offshore Industry
Advisory Committee] meeting.Pl Alan Sefton gave a report
on major accidents in recent months across the spectrum. I
got the feeling that it was exactly the type of report that
the Department of Energy would have given pre- Piper (Al-
pha). And I'm concerned about the groundswell that we are
warned about." Our recent work overwhelmingly concurs
with this statement that there has been little change in safety
standards offshore since Piper Alpha.
Discussion and Conclusion The opportunity to develop a
more protective safety regime offshore presented by the
Piper Alpha disaster and the subsequent Cullen Inquiry was
not taken. We have argued that a key part of the explanation
for this is to be found in the launch of Cost Reduction In-
itiative for the New Era by the United Kingdom Offshore
Operators' Association (UKOOA), with the full support of
the Department of Trade and Industry. CRINE established
itself as a dominant set of practices and philosophies
throughout the industry to such an extent and at such a speed
that Tim Eggar was able to proclaim triumphantly that "The
UK leads the world in the new skills of cost reduction.t'P?
Its pervasiveness means that the conditions under which oil
companies can operate in the North Sea have been redefined
in a way that is increasingly favourable to the largest oil
companies. These new realities of production have been ac-
cepted by the regulators and have set real limits upon levels
of safety provision. This redefinition of legal safety stand-
ards by the regulated, and according to economic criteria,
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was made possible by a system of self regulation organised
around goal-setting and the principle of ALARP. This regu-
latory regime was one that UKOOA did much to advocate
during the hearings presided over by Lord Cullen.
CRINE seeks to exploit the weaknesses of this self-regu-
latory framework as part of a deliberate, general strategy
on the part of oil companies to resist the consequences of
a more protective regulatory regime. The success of CRINE
can only be understood within supportive broad political
and economic contexts, not least of which are the discourses
of globalization. These discourses provide fuel to claims re-
garding the potential flight of oil capital and imply that Gov-
ernments must exercise caution in imposing additional
"burdens" (that is, costs arising from so-called "social" regu-
lation) 'upon business. Such discourses have found a perfect
complement in the deregulatory initiatives of successive
Conservative governments; indeed, there has been such com-
plementarity that it is possible to identify extremely close
ideological, institutional, and even personal alliances be-
tween the oil companies and the DTI. The new Labour Gov-
ernment has as yet given no signs that such institutional
and ideological links will be severed. Moreover, the appoint-
ment by the new Government of Lord Simon, former chair
of BP (and still a major shareholder) as Minister for EU
Competitiveness is perhaps one sign that personal relation-
ships may also continue to be important.
There is one further dimension to the significance of
CRINE - a dimension not mentioned in any of the CRINE
literature - namely, that the cost reduction campaign has
contributed significantly to an enormous increase in cash
flow accruing to the operating companies. According to a
recent report compiled by industry analysts WoodMackenzie,
aggregate cash flow in the UKCS will have risen from less
that £ 1 billion in 1992 to more than £4 billion in 1996.93
Furthermore, WoodMackenzie project annual levels of net
cash flow to rise to over £7 billion before the turn of the
century. WoodMackenzie also provide an analysis of where
this "disposable income" is likely to be deployed, concluding
that only 40% will be spent on developments in the UKCS.
The rest will most likely go abroad to develop some of the
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new oil and gas provinces, such as those in Asia and South
America.
This huge amount of capital has been accrued partially
through the effectiveness of the CRINE initiative. However,
this is not its only source. Since 1983, Conservative gov-
ernments have consistently sought to reduce the tax "burden"
on the operating companies,94 a policy described as an
"emasculation" of the tax regime.P> The cumulative effect
of these changes has seen Government revenues from taxes
and royalties tumble from a high point of over £12 billion
in 1984/85 to £2.4 billion in 1995/96.96 Taxation for every
pound of North Sea profit is now around a quarter of what
it was 10 years ago.?? The 1993 budget, which abolished
Petroleum Revenue Tax, was a key point in this process.
CRINE was well timed to complement the restructuring of
the tax regime and ensure the flow of disposable income to
the operators.f" Contrary to industries' claims about survival,
the WoodMackenzie report is part of a growing body of
evidence indicating that CRINE has been motivated not by
the instinct to survive, but by the urge to increase disposable
income and boost profits. Tragically, it appears that the off-
shore workforce, by enduring the worst excesses of CRINE,
is paying a heavy price for increasing the flow of capital
into the coffers of the oil majors, 60% of which may not
even be re-deployed to the UKCS, never mind be invested
in securing jobs or improving working conditions.
Meanwhile, the post-Cullen offshore safety regime, es-
tablished at a moment which might have been conducive to
the emergence of real improvement in safety conditions, has
failed to establish an active role in safety decisions for the
workforce. Notwithstanding the inherent limits within any
tripartite self-regulatory system - not least of which one
based upon the principle of reasonable practicability - if
such a system is to be at all progressive or protective then
the strength of labour in general, and the formal roles for
"workers" representatives in particular, are crucial. When
"workers" organisations are weakened or non-existent; when
managements reassert their rights to manage; and when
claims regarding poor economic conditions (and prospects)
hold sway, then any progressive elements of self-regulation
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will disintegrate, and there will emerge a de facto deregu-
lation.P? All of these factors currently exist in the offshore
oil industry. Further, the disintegration of self-regulation is
likely to be exacerbated both by the apparent willingness
of the DTI to accommodate the deregulatory demands of
the industry and by the HSE's apparent acceptance of the
industry view of feasibility. As economic pressures intensify,
or are said to be intensifying, there seems to be little to
stop the standards established under a goal setting regime
from being gradually eroded. Without a shift in regulatory
strategy, which is only likely to be effected through an up-
surge in activity on the part of organised labour and other
pro-regulatory forces, there appears to be little chance of
abating the disintegration of self-regulation and the gradual
erosion of safety standards on offshore platforms. The most
likely - though, as this paper indicates, temporary - check
on such trends would be another large scale loss of life in
the industry.
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